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Abstract
It would be interesting if a signcryption scheme in the standard model could be
made certificateless. One of interesting attempts is due to Liu, Hu, Zhang and
Ma, who published a certificateless signcryption scheme in the standard model
in Volume 180 (3), Information Science, in 2010. In this paper, we provide a
cryptanalysis on this scheme and show that it is insecure under two kinds of
subtle public key replacement attacks. We show that it does not meet the basic
requirements of confidentiality and non-repudoation.
Keywords: certificateless cryptography, signcryption, public key replacement
attack

1. Introduction
In traditional public key cryptography, a trusted third party called certification authority (CA) is employed to issue public key certificates to users.
Public-key certification poses some problems in certificate management, including certificate generation, storage, distribution and revocation. To avoid the
costly certificate management, Shamir [17] introduced the identity-based public
key cryptography (ID-PKC). In ID-PKC, digital identities of users such as email
address, phone number, etc. can be utilized as public keys. However, a trusted
third party is required to compute private keys of users. This unfortunately
introduces the key escrow problem.
Certificateless cryptography (CLC) was introduced by Al-Ryiami and Paterson [1] in order to overcome the problem of key escrow in ID-PKC and maintain
certificate freeness. In CLC, a third party called Key Generation Center (KGC)
is also employed to help users generate their private keys. However, the KGC
only produces a partial private key for a user. To generate the full private key,
the user uses the partial private key and a secret value chosen by himself. As the
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secret value is known to the user only, the KGC cannot compute the full private
key of the user. Therefore, the key escrow problem in ID-PKC is eliminated.
Many certificateless cryptosystems have been proposed, including encryption
schemes [1, 10, 24, 25], signature schemes [1, 11, 28, 29], key agreement protocols [1, 31], threshold cryptosystems [8, 14, 23, 26], and signcryption schemes
[3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 21, 22]. As the adversary models in CLC are more complex,
the security proofs in CLC are more challenging. We notice that some existing
certificateless cryptosystems have been broken [16, 18, 19, 20].
Signcryption, introduced by Zheng [32], is a cryptographic primitive, which
captures the encryption and signature simultaneously, and is more efficient than
the sign-then-encrypt method. Many secure signcryption schemes have been
proposed in traditional public key cryptosystem (e.g., [33, 2]). The signcryption
in ID-PKC was first investigated by Malone-Lee [15]. Later, Boyen [6] defined
the formal security model for identity-based signcryption schemes and proposed
a provably secure scheme in the model. A more efficient ID-based signcryption
scheme proven secure in Boyen’s model [6] was given in [9].
As a primitive in CLC, certificateless signcryption (CLSC) schemes can be
used in communication capturing both confidentiality and non-repudiation. The
first CLSC scheme was introduced by Barbosa and Farshim [4] with a formal security analysis in the random oracle model. Later, some efficient CLSC schemes
were proposed [3, 21, 22]. Unfortunately, as shown in [16, 18], all the above
schemes [4, 21, 3] have security flaws. Li et al. commented on the certificateless
hybrid signcryption in [12]. The security of the above mentioned schemes are
proven in the random oracle model which can only be considered as a heuristic
argument [7]. We notice that, Barreto et al. [5] depicted a method to construct
efficient CLSC schemes. However, they only gave the assessment of the security
implications of their proposal without a formal security proof. Very recently,
Liu et al. [13] introduced an efficient certificateless signcryption scheme with
the security proof in the standard model. They claimed that their scheme was
provably secure under the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and the
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Unfortunately, their Security proof
is not sound [16, 20] and is in fact insecure.
In this paper, we show that the CLSC scheme in [13] is flawed by demonstrating two kinds of subtle public key replacement attacks against it. In our
first attack, we show that a Type I Adversary who replaces a receiver’s public
key can decrypt any signcrypted message generated under the replaced public
key. This means the scheme in [13] is not a secure one-way encryption. In the
other attack, we show that a Type I Adversary who uses public key replacement
attack may impersonate any sender to send valid signcrypted message to a receiver. Therefore, the scheme [13] is subject to the universal forgery of Type I
attackers. Thus, the original CLSC scheme of Liu et al. [13] fails to achieve any
of the security goals for a signcryption scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries. Section 3 introduces the definition and the security notions for certificateless signcryption schemes. Section 4 reviews the certificateless signcryption
(CLSC) scheme of Liu et al. [13]. Section 5 presents the attacks on Liu et al.’s
2

scheme. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. Preliminaries
This section revisits some basic concepts and necessary complexity assumptions.
2.1. Bilinear Maps
Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups with prime order p, g a
generator of G1 . A map ê : G1 × G1 → G2 is called a bilinear map if it satisfies
the following properties:
• Bilinearity: ê(g a , hb ) = ê(g, h)ab , for all a, b ∈ Zp∗ , and g, h ∈ G1 .
• Non-degeneracy: There exit g, h ∈ G1 such that ê(g, h) 6= IG2 , where IG2
is the identity element of G2 .
• Computability: There exits an efficient algorithm to compute ê(g, h) for
all g, h ∈ G1 .
2.2. Complexity Assumptions
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in G1 : Given a randomly
chosen g ∈ G1 , as well as g a , g b , compute g ab for unknown a and b.
The CDH problem in G2 can be defined similarly. The CDH assumption
means that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the CDH problems
in both G1 and G2 with non-negligible probability.
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem in (G1 , G2 , ê): Given
a randomly chosen g ∈ G1 , as well as g a , g b , g c and h ∈ G2 , decide whether
h = ê(g, g)abc for unknown a, b and c.
The DBDH assumption means that there is no polynomial time algorithm
to solve the DBDH problem in (G1 , G2 , ê) with non-negligible probability.
3. Certificateless Signcryption
3.1. Formal Definition of Certificateless Signcryption Schemes
A certificateless signcryption scheme is defined by a six-tuple of probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms [13]:
• Setup: This algorithm is run by the KGC. It takes as input a security
parameter k and returns the system parameters params and the system
master secret key msk. After running this algorithm, the KGC publishes
the params and keeps the msk secret.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm is run by the KGC, after verifying the user’s identity. It takes as input params, msk and an identity
∗
u ∈ {0, 1} of a user and returns a partial private key du .
3

• User-Key-Generate: This algorithm takes as input params, msk, and a
user’s identity u, and returns a randomly chosen secret value xu and the
public key pku of the user. Then the user distributes pku without being
certificated.
• Set-Private-Key: This algorithm takes as input params, the partial private
key du and the secret value xu and returns the user’s full private key sku .
• Signcrypt: This algorithm takes as input params, the plaintext M , the
sender’s private key skS , the sender’s public key pkS , the receiver’s identity
uR and its public key pkR and returns a signcrypted text σ or an error
symbol ⊥.
• Unsigncrypt: This algorithm takes as input a signcrypted text σ, the receiver’s private key skR , the sender’s identity uS and public key pkS , and
returns a plain text M or an error symbol ⊥.
3.2. Security Requirements of Certificateless Signcryption
The basic security requirements for a signcryption scheme are ‘Message Confidentiality’ and‘Non-repudiation’. Intuitively, Message Confidentiality means
that no adversary can learn the message in the signcrypted text. We say that a
signcryption scheme offers Non-repudiation if it prevents the sender of a signcrypted text from repudiating his signature. In other words, without the possession of the full private key of a sender, nobody can generate valid signcrypted
texts on behalf of the sender. Precise definitions of Message Confidentiality and
Non-repudiation are defined using security models. For the detail, please refer
to [9].
For a cryptographic scheme to be secure in CLC, it requires that the scheme
should resist the attacks of both Type I Adversaries and Type II Adversaries.
A Type I Adversary does not have access to the master key of the KGC, but he
has the ability to replace the public key of any user with a value of his choice.
While a Type II Adversary has access to the master key of the KGC but is
not allowed to perform public key replacement. The research on CLC reveals
that it is challenging to design a scheme secure against a Type I Adversary.
In fact, many existing cryptographic schemes in CLC are vulnerable to public
key replacement attacks of a Type I Adversary [3, 16, 18, 19, 21]. The main
reason is, in CLC, no certificate is used to provide the binding between a user
and his public key. Thus, a Type I Adversary can choose any value in the
public key space as a target user’s public key. As a signcryption scheme aiming
to provide both functionalities of public key encryption and signature, for a
signcryption scheme in CLC to be secure against a Type I Adversary, it should
satisfy: 1) even if a sender uses a replaced public key (chosen by the adversary)
of a receiver to generate a signcrypted text, a Type I Adversary still cannot
extract the plaintext from the signcrypted text. 2) a Type I Adversary who
replaces the public key of the sender cannot impersonate the sender to generate
a valid signcrypted text on behalf of the sender.
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4. Revisiting the Certificateless Signcryption (CLSC) Scheme of Liu
et al.
The scheme includes three parties: a KGC, a sender with identity uS , and
a receiver with identity uR . It consists of the following 6 algorithms.
• Setup: Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups with prime
order p, g a generator of G1 . Given a bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → G2
n
and a collision resistant hash function H : {0, 1} → {0, 1}m , the KGC
randomly chooses a value α ∈ Zp and then computes g1 = g α . The KGC
chooses three random values g2 , u0 , v 0 in G1 and two vectors U = (ui )n
and V = (vj )m whose coordinates are selected from G1 as well. It keeps
the system master secret key msk = g2α secret and publishes the system
parameters
params = {G1 , G2 , ê, g, g1 , g2 , u0 , v 0 , U, V, H}.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: Denote by u[i] the ith bit of an identity u ∈
∗
{0, 1} , and U = {i|u[i] = 1, i = 1, 2...n}. To generate the partial private
key for 19 a user with identity u, the KGC chooses ru ∈ Zp uniformly at
random and computes
Y
ru
du = (du1 , du2 ) = (g2α (u0
ui ) , g ru ).
i∈U

Respectively, we denote the sender’s and receiver’s partial private keys as
Y
rS
dS = (dS1 , dS2 ) = (g2α (u0
ui ) , g rS )
i∈US

and
dR = (dR1 , dR2 ) = g2α (u0

Y

rR

ui ) , g rR ).

i∈UR

• User-Key-Generate: An user with identity u randomly chooses a value xu ∈
Zp and outputs his secret value xu and public key pku = ê(g1 , g2 )xu .
• Set-Private-Key: The user with 20 identity u randomly chooses r0 ∈ Zp .
Then he computes
Y
Y
0
0
sku = (sku1 , sku2 ) = (dxu1u (u0
ui )r , dxu2u g r ) = (g2αxu (u0
ui )t , g t )
i∈U

i∈U

where t = ru xu + r0 .
• Signcrypt: The sender chooses a random r00 , then sends the message M ∈
G2 to a receiver with public key pkR = ê(g1 , g2 )xR as follows:
00

00

r
1. Compute σ1 = M · pkR
= M · ê(g1 , g2 )xR r .
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00

2. Compute σ2 = g r .
Q
00
3. Compute σ3 = (u0
ui )r .
i∈UR

4. Set σ4 = sks2 .
m
5. Compute h = H(σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ4 , uR , pkR ) ∈ {0, 1} , where h[j] is the
jth bit of h and M = {j|h[j] = 1, j = 1, 2...m}.
Q
00
6. Compute σ5 = sks1 · (v 0
vj ) r .
j∈M

7. Output the signcrypted text σ = (σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ4 , σ5 ).
• Unsigncrypt: On receiving the signcrypted text σ = (σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ4 , σ5 ), the
receiver decrypts the signcrypted text as follows.
m

1. Compute h = H(σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ4 , uR , pkR ) ∈ {0, 1} , and M = {j|h[j] =
1, j = 1, 2...m}, where h[j] is the jth bit of h.
2. If the equality
Y
Y
ê(σ5 , g) = pkS · ê(u0
ui , σ4 ) · ê(v 0
vj , σ2 )
i∈US

j∈M

holds, compute and output
M = σ1 · ê(σ3 , skR2 )/ê(σ2 , skR1 ).
Otherwise, output an error symbol ⊥.
5. Analysis of the CLSC Scheme by Liu et al.
In this section, we describe our attacks on Liu et al.’s scheme [13] to show
its security vulnerabilities.
5.1. Analysis of message confidentiality
We show that Liu et al.’s scheme [13] does not satisfy the message confidentiality property in this section. In particular, a Type I Adversary A who uses a
public key replacement attack can unsigncrypt any signcrypted text generated
under the replaced public key of a receiver. The concrete attack is described in
three stages.
0

0
Stage 1: In this stage, A randomly picks x0R ∈ Zp , computes pkR
= ê(g, g)xR ,
0
and replaces the receiver’s public key pkR with pkR .

Stage 2: In CL-PKC, since no certificate is provided to bind a user and his
0
public key, a sender who receives the replaced public key pkR
cannot detect that
the public key of the receiver is replaced by A. Thus, the sender will generate
a signcrypted text with the replaced public key of the receiver as follows.
0
1. Choose a random r00 ∈ Zp , compute σ1∗ = M · pkR
r 00
2. Compute σ2 = g .
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r 00

0

00

= M · ê(g, g)xR r .

3. Compute σ3 = (u0

Q

00

ui )r .

i∈UR

4. Set σ4 = sks2 .
m
0
5. Compute m∗ = H(σ1∗ , σ2 , σ3 , σ4 , uR , pkR
) ∈ {0, 1} , where m[j] is the jth
bit of m∗ and M = {j|m[j] = 1, j = 1, 2...m}.
Q
00
6. Compute σ5 = sks1 · (v 0
v j )r .
j∈M

7. Output the signcrypted text σ ∗ = (σ1∗ , σ2 , σ3 , σ4 , σ5 ).
Stage 3: On receiving the signcrypted text σ ∗ = (σ1∗ , σ2 , σ3 , σ4 , σ5 ), A can
extract the plain text by using the following algorithm.
1. Compute
m

0
m∗ = H(σ1∗ , σ2 , σ3 , σ4 , uR , pkR
) ∈ {0, 1} ,

M = {j|m[j] = 1, j = 1, 2...m}, where m[j] is the jth bit of m∗ .
Q
Q
2. If the equality ê(σ5 , g) = pkS · ê(u0
ui , σ4 ) · ê(v 0
vj , σ2 ) holds, the
i∈US

j∈M
0

adversary obtains the message M by computing M = σ1∗ · ê(σ2 , g)−xR .
The correctness can be verified by the following equalities.
ê(σ5 , g)

Y

= ê(sks1 (v 0

00

vj )r , g)

j∈M

=

ê(g2αxs , g)

· ê((u0

Y

Y

ui )ts , g) · ê((v 0

i∈US
α xs

= ê(g2 , g )

· ê(u

0

Y

j∈M

ui , σ4 ) · ê(v

0

i∈US

= pkS · ê(u0

Y

00

vj )r , g)

ui , σ4 ) · ê(v 0

i∈US

Y

vj , σ2 )

j∈M

Y

vj , σ2 )

j∈M

where t = rS xs + r0 .
0

σ1∗ · ê(σ2 , g)−xR

00

0

=

σ1∗ · ê(g r , g)−xR

=

σ1∗ · ê(g, g)−xR r

=

0
σ1∗ · pkR

=

M

0

00

−r 00

Thus, the scheme fails to satisfy the requirement of message confidentiality.
5.2. Analysis of non-repudiation
A secure CLSC scheme should have the property that a sender cannot deny
that he has performed a valid signcryption and has sent the signcrypted text
to a receiver. Furthermore, it requires that, without knowing the full private
key of a sender, any adversary cannot impersonate the sender to generate valid
signcrypted texts. In the following, we show that a Type I Adversary A can
7

successfully forge a valid signcrypted text to cheat the receiver by replacing the
sender’s public key. The attack consists of the following three stages:
Stage 1. In this stage, A randomly picks x0S ∈ Zp and replaces the sender’s
0
public key with pkS0 = ê(g, g)xS .
Stage 2. In this stage, A impersonates the sender to generate a signcrypted
text under the replaced public key. A 21 proceeds as follows.
00
r 00
1. Choose a random r00 ∈ Zp , compute σ1 = M · pkR
= M · ê(g1 , g2 )xR r .
00
2. Compute σ2 = g r . Q
00
3. Compute σ3 = (u0
ui )r .
i∈UR

4. Randomly choose a ∈ Zp , and compute σ4∗ = g a .
5. Compute
m
h = H(σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ4∗ , uR , pkR ) ∈ {0, 1} ,
and M = {j|h[j] = 1, j =Q1, 2...m}, where
is the jth bit of h.
Q h[j]
0
00
ui )a · (v 0
vj ) r .
6. Compute σ5∗ = g xS · (u0
i∈US

j∈M

7. Output the signcrypted text σ ∗ = (σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ4∗ , σ5∗ ).
Finally, A sends the signcrypted text σ ∗ = (σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ4∗ , σ5∗ ) together with
the sender’s identity and the replaced public key to the receiver.
Stage 3. We notice that, since there is no binding between a user’s identity
and his public key, the receiver cannot detect that the sender’s public key is
replaced by A. In this stage, upon receiving the signcrypted text, the receiver
invokes the Unsigncrypt algorithm as follows.
1. Compute
m
h = H(σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ4∗ , uR , pkR ) ∈ {0, 1} ,
and M = {j|h[j] = 1, j = 1, 2...m}, where h[j] is the jth bit of h.
2. Check the validity of the signcrypted text by verifying
Y
Y
ê(σ5∗ , g) = pkS0 · ê(u0
ui , σ4∗ ) · ê(v 0
vj , σ2 ).
i∈US

j∈M

If the equation holds, he computes and outputs
M = σ1 · ê(σ3 , skR2 )/ê(σ2 , skR1 ).
Otherwise, he outputs an error symbol ⊥.
Since we have
ê(σ5∗ , g)

0

= ê(g xS · (u0

Y
i∈US

x0S

· ê(u

= ê(g, g)

0

Y

ui )a · (v 0

j∈M

Y

ui , g ) · ê(v 0
a

i∈US

=

pkS0

0

· ê(u

Y

00

vj )r , g)

ui , σ4∗ )

i∈US

· ê(v

Y

00

vj , g r )

j∈M
0

j∈M
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Y

vj , σ2 ),

the verification equation always holds. This declares that the forged signcrypted
text (σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ4∗ , σ5∗ ) is valid. Therefore, the scheme is subject to universal
forgery with respect to a Type I Adversary A who replaces the sender’s public
key.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrated two kinds of subtle public key replacement
attacks against the recently proposed certificateless signcryption scheme by Liu
et al.. In our attacks, an adversary can replace the receiver’s public key to
decrypt the sender’s signcrypted text and obtain the message easily, and a Type
I Adversary can forge a valid signcrypted text by replacing the public key of a
sender. Thus, the certificateless signcryption scheme of Liu et al. fails to meet
the requirements of confidentiality and non-repudiation for a secure signcryption
scheme.
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